Abstract
In their article, Merilaita et al. (2013) discuss what distractive markings are and how they may work as a potential camouflage type. They raise a number of issues, with a key debate being how to test the theory of distractive markings and what constitutes appropriate scientific experiments. Merilaita et al. argue that “because distractive markings are by definition a camouflage strategy, it is necessary to show that a marking actually decreases the risk of predation before one can argue it has anything to do with a distractive effect. Because the spots in Stevens et al. (2013) did not facilitate concealment, they were inevitably not distractive.” However, one cannot claim that distractive camouflage does by its own definition reduce predation risk because that makes it an untestable, self-affirming hypothesis. Distractive markings are not automatically “by definition a camouflage strategy,” but rather a theory for how one type of concealment might potentially work. Furthermore, the experiments of Dimitrova et al. (2009) that claim to support the distractive theory, showing high contrast prey were detected more slowly than low contrast prey, do not demonstrate why they obtained detection differences. There is no evidence from their article that differences in detection rates of prey were due to any distractive mechanism. Thus, by their own logic, their experiments do not show distraction either.

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