Deontic Argumentation
Preprint
Abstract
We address the issue of defining a semantics for deontic argumentation that supports weak permission. Some recent results show that grounded semantics do not support weak permission when there is a conflict between two obligations. We provide a definition of Deontic Argumentation Theory that accounts for weak permission, and we recall the result about grounded semantics. Then, we propose a new semantics that supports weak permission.Keywords
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