Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
Authors:
- 9 May 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 36 (3) , 537-597
Abstract
To what extent does a more competent public bureaucracy contribute to better economic outcomes? We address this question in the context of the US federal procurement of services and works, by combining contract-level data on procurement performance and bureau-level data on competence and workforce characteristics. We use the death occurrences of specific types of employees as instruments and find that an increase in bureau competence causes a significant and economically important reduction in (a) time delays, (b) cost overruns, and (c) number of renegotiations. Cooperation within the office appears to be a key driver of the findings. (JEL D73, H11, H57, L26).Keywords
Funding Information
- European Research Council (Stg-REPCOR-679217)
- Handelsbanken (P16-0277)
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