A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs*
Open Access
- 17 September 2014
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 129 (4) , 1753-1797
Abstract
This paper proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents' beliefs. While this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.Keywords
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