Contract-Based Demand Response Model for High Performance Computing Systems
Authors:
- Kishwar AhmedKAKishwar Ahmed
- Jesse BullJBJesse Bull
- Jason LiuJLJason Liu
- 1 December 2018
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 580-589
Abstract
High-performance computing (HPC) systems can consume substantial electricity during their operation, and consequently incur significant energy cost. Demand response is a scheme adopted by energy consumers to reduce energy use during the high load periods upon request from the power grid. In this paper, we propose a demand response model to allow both HPC operators and HPC users to jointly reduce the energy consumption. We apply the contract theory, originated from economics for studying the contractual arrangements among economic actors, and design a reward mechanism to ensure participation of both HPC operators and HPC users in the demand response program. We perform both analytical and simulation studies of our proposed approach. Our analyses show that our contract-based demand response model is both feasible (in ensuring both individual rationality and incentive compatibility) and optimal. The trace-based simulation demonstrates the practicality of the proposed approach.Keywords
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