Beliefs and Subdoxastic States
Author:
- Stephen P. StichSSStephen P. Stich
- 1 December 1978
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 45 (4) , 499-518
Abstract
It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.Keywords
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