Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: From variational to Generalized Nash Equilibrium
Authors:
- Hélène Le CadreHCHélène Le Cadre
- Paulin JacquotPJPaulin Jacquot
- Cheng WanCWCheng Wan
- Clémence AlasseurCAClémence Alasseur
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- 1 April 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 282 (2) , 753-771
Abstract
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Funding Information
- Électricité de France
- Vlaamse Instelling voor Technologisch Onderzoek
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