On cost‐sharing mechanisms in cognitive radio networks
- 18 August 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in European Transactions on Telecommunications
- Vol. 22 (8) , 515-521
Abstract
We present a framework and pertinent formulations for a coalition of secondary cognitive radios that are willing to lease inactive spectrum band from a primary system through auctioning and to share the received bandwidth and the associated cost among themselves using multiple access techniques. We cast this scenario to submodular class of games and show how a link can be established between the truthful auctioning mechanism and the cost‐sharing algorithm. Simulation results verify that the deployed cost‐sharing technique leads to encouraging the secondary cognitive radios to truthfully announce their bids. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
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