Quantum Truncated Differential and Boomerang Attack
Open Access
Abstract
In order to design quantum-safe block ciphers, it is crucial to investigate the application of quantum algorithms to cryptographic analysis tools. In this study, we use the Bernstein–Vazirani algorithm to enhance truncated differential cryptanalysis and boomerang cryptanalysis. We first propose a quantum algorithm for finding truncated differentials, then rigorously prove that the output truncated differentials must have high differential probability for the vast majority of keys in the key space. Subsequently, based on this algorithm, we design a quantum algorithm for finding boomerang distinguishers. The quantum circuits of the two proposed quantum algorithms contain only polynomial quantum gates and qubits. Compared with classical tools for searching truncated differentials or boomerang distinguishers, the proposed algorithms can maintain the polynomial complexity while fully considering the impact of S-boxes and key scheduling.Keywords
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Funding Information
- Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Municipality (4234084, ZCL21012)
- Open Research Fund of Key Laboratory of Cryptography of Zhejiang Province (4234084, ZCL21012)
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