Capacity constraints, mergers and collusion
Authors:
- Olivier CompteOCOlivier Compte
- Frédéric JennyFJFrédéric Jenny
- Patrick ReyPRPatrick Rey
- 1 January 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 46 (1) , 1-29
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price Wars1999
- Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraintsJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1995
- Some Results on Optimal Penal Codes in Asymmetric Bertrand SupergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1994
- Excess Capacity and CollusionInternational Economic Review, 1990
- Multimarket Contact and Collusive BehaviorThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1990
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity ConstraintsReview of Economic Studies, 1987
- Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and QuantitiesReview of Economic Studies, 1987
- Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1986
- Price Setting Supergames with Capacity ConstraintsReview of Economic Studies, 1985
- Horizontal mergers and collusive behaviorInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1984