Social Preferences and the Response to Incentives: Evidence from Personnel Data*
Authors:
- Oriana BandieraOBOriana Bandiera
- Iwan BarankayIBIwan Barankay
- Imran RasulIRImran Rasul
- 1 August 2005
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 120 (3) , 917-962
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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