Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
Authors:
- Pak Hung AuPAPak Hung Au
- Keiichi KawaiKKKeiichi Kawai
- 1 January 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 119, 56-78
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- UNSW
- Australian Research Council (RG160734)
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