Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
Author:
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 48 (1) , 14-20
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
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