Dynamic Incentives and Agent Discrimination in Broiler Production Tournaments
Authors:
- Porametr LeegomonchaiPLPorametr Leegomonchai
- Tomislav VukinaTVTomislav Vukina
- 17 October 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 14 (4) , 849-877
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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