Multi-Unit Auctions: A Comparison of Static and Dynamic Mechanisms
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 December 1999
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We compare, experimentally, the Vickrey auction and an ascending-price auction recently introduced by Ausubel (1997). We evaluate the relative performance of both auctions in terms of efficiency and revenue in multi-unit environments where valuations either have a common-value component or are private information. We find that the Ausubel auction is less prone to overbidding and may yield higher revenue than the Vickrey auction. The gain in revenue seems to be coupled with a loss of efficiency.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 15 references indexed in Scilit:
- Poincaré duality groups2000
- Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auctionExperimental Economics, 2000
- Auction Theory: A Guide to the LiteratureJournal of Economic Surveys, 1999
- Multi-unit auctions with uniform pricesEconomic Theory, 1998
- EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISONS OF AUCTIONS UNDER SINGLE‐AND MULTI‐UNIT DEMANDEconomic Inquiry, 1998
- The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves versus the Simultaneous Ascending Auction: An Experimental ApproachSSRN Electronic Journal, 1998
- Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation MechanismsJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997
- Necessary Conditions for Efficient Multiple-Bid Auctions1997
- Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory StudyEconometrica, 1987
- INCENTIVES AND BEHAVIOR IN ENGLISH, DUTCH AND SEALED-BID AUCTIONSEconomic Inquiry, 1980