When the agency wants too much: Experimental evidence on unfair audits and tax compliance
Authors:
- Bora LanceeBLBora Lancee
- Lucia RosselLRLucia Rossel
- Matthias KasperMKMatthias Kasper
Open Access
- 23 August 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 214, 406-442
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
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