Capture by Threat
Authors:
- Ernesto Dal BóEBErnesto Dal Bó
- Rafael Di TellaRTRafael Di Tella
- 1 October 2003
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 111 (5) , 1123-1154
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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