Stock and Option Grants with Performance-based Vesting Provisions
Authors:
- Carr BettisCBCarr Bettis
- John BizjakJBJohn Bizjak
- Jeffrey ColesJCJeffrey Coles
- Swaminathan KalpathySKSwaminathan Kalpathy
- 31 August 2010
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 23 (10) , 3849-3888
Abstract
We assemble a sample of 983 equity-based awards that include either an accelerated- or a contingent-vesting provision tied to firm performance and explore the frequency, contractual nature, usage, and implications of such awards. We find that performance-vesting (p-v) provisions specify meaningful performance hurdles and provide significant incentives for executives. The propensity to use p-v provisions is positively related to the arrival of a new CEO and the proportion of outsiders on the board of directors and negatively related to prior stock performance. Performance-vesting firms have significantly better subsequent operating performance than control firms. Abnormal accounting performance does not arise from earnings management or discernible differences in financial or investment policy.Keywords
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