Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
Authors:
- Reint GroppRGReint Gropp
- Hendrik HakenesHHHendrik Hakenes
- Isabel SchnabelISIsabel Schnabel
- 26 November 2010
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 24 (6) , 2084-2120
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- The UK Special Resolution Regime for Failing Banks in an International ContextSSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
- Deposit Insurance around the World: A Comprehensive Database2008
- Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First resultsJournal of Banking & Finance, 2006
- Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2004
- Competition and Financial StabilityJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2004
- Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effectJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2003
- Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigationJournal of Monetary Economics, 2002
- Establishing banking market definitions through estimation of residual deposit supply equationsJournal of Banking & Finance, 1999
- Diversification, Size, and Risk at Bank Holding CompaniesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997
- Size and performance of banking firmsJournal of Monetary Economics, 1993