POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS*
Authors:
- 1 March 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 17-39
Abstract
A rent or transfer is politically contestable when policy decisions are subject to influence by potential beneficiaries and losers. This paper studies contestablility of rents and transfers when contenders place different valuations on the politically allocated prize. Asymmetric valuation inhibits participation by low‐valuation contenders. The model explains the phenomena of small numbers of active participants in contests to exercise political influence and low lobbying and other influence‐seeking outlays relative to the value of politically allocated prizes.Keywords
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