Abstract
This study develops a multi-agent evolutionary game model that incorporates both retailers and heterogeneous logistics providers, extending beyond prior dyadic models that typically isolate either channel choice or logistics competition. By comparing scenarios with and without the BOPS channel, the framework captures the dynamic interactions between retailers and logistics providers. The results show that introducing In-Store Pickup significantly increases market demand and retailer revenue by reducing consumer waiting time, but it also produces a revenue crowding effect for slow logistics providers. For fast providers, the impact depends on their ability to adjust service quality: lowering service levels helps retain market share, while efficiency improvement enhances profitability. Furthermore, consumer product valuation plays a critical role in driving retailers toward dual-provider or hybrid strategies. The methodological innovation lies in integrating heterogeneous logistics service differentiation with channel strategy selection into a unified evolutionary game framework. The study contributes by proposing a dynamic “efficiency threshold–channel selection” mechanism, offering both theoretical advancement in omnichannel retailing research and managerial insights for retailers and logistics providers seeking to optimize logistics capabilities and channel collaboration.
Funding Information
  • Chongqing University of Finance and Economics Scientific Research Project (20257004, CYB25290)
  • Chongqing graduate research and innovation project (20257004, CYB25290)

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