The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action
Author:
- David FeenyDFDavid Feeny
- 1 August 1983
- journal article
- Published by Duke University Press in The Journal of Asian Studies
- Vol. 42 (4) , 769-789
Abstract
The analytical and empirical foundations of the moral-economy and rationalchoice approaches to peasant behavior are critically examined. Normative decisionmaking models are compared to models that assume household utility maximization. Differences between collective and individual rationality are highlighted. The importance and implications of risk aversion are explored. The effect of the introduction of markets on the economic security of peasant producers is considered, and evidence from Southeast Asian economic history is used to test the implications of both approaches. The results serve to challenge and qualify the arguments put forth by the moral economists on both analytical and empirical grounds.Keywords
This publication has 68 references indexed in Scilit:
- Interest and Ideology in the Study of Agrarian PoliticsPolitics & Society, 1981
- VILLAGES AS INTEREST GROUPS: THE DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES IN INDIAKyklos, 1980
- Dearth, Famine, and Risk: The Changing Impact of Crop Failures in Western India, 1870–1920The Journal of Economic History, 1979
- Agricultural Development and Land Tenancy in a Peasant Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical AnalysisAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1979
- SHARE CONTRACTS, LIMITED INFORMATION AND PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTYAustralian Economic Papers, 1978
- The Theory of Share Tenancy Revisited--AgainJournal of Political Economy, 1977
- A Microeconometric Chronicle of the Green RevolutionEconomic Development and Cultural Change, 1975
- Railroads, Prices, and Peasant Rationality: India 1860–1900The Journal of Economic History, 1974
- Risk, Entrepreneurship, and TenancyJournal of Political Economy, 1973
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970