Single versus multiple-prize all-pay auctions to finance public goods: An experimental analysis
Authors:
- Marco FaravelliMFMarco Faravelli
- Luca StancaLSLuca Stanca
- 1 February 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 81 (2) , 677-688
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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