Cream-Skimming, Parking and Other Intended and Unintended Effects of High-Powered, Performance-Based Contracts
Authors:
- Pierre KoningPKPierre Koning
- Carolyn J. HeinrichCHCarolyn J. Heinrich
- 21 March 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
- Vol. 32 (3) , 461-483
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentivesLabour Economics, 2011
- One Standard Fits All? The Pros and Cons of Performance Standard AdjustmentsPublic Administration Review, 2009
- Do accountability and voucher threats improve low-performing schools?Journal of Public Economics, 2006
- The Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Evidence from a Prototypical Job Training ProgramJournal of Labor Economics, 2004
- An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance IncentivesJournal of Labor Economics, 2004
- The Role of Incentives in the Public Sector: Issues and EvidenceOxford Review of Economic Policy, 2003
- Managing contract performance: A transaction costs approachJournal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2003
- Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative ReviewThe Journal of Human Resources, 2002
- When Can Public Policy Makers Rely on Private Markets? The Effective Provision of Social ServicesThe Economic Journal, 2000
- Exploring the relationship between performance management and program impact: A case study of the job training partnership actJournal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2000