Aspiration formation and satisficing in search with(out) competition
Authors:
- 14 April 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Zealand Economic Papers
- Vol. 45 (1-2) , 23-45
Abstract
We experimentally explore individual and competitive search, and we test whether generally accepted principles of bounded rationality adequately explain observed search behavior. Subjects can, at a cost, employ screening and selection methods not only facilitating search but also directly revealing their aspirations. Most subjects follow the single threshold heuristic after extensive experimentation. Surprisingly, aspiration levels are set below the maximum value of all previously inspected alternatives. In competitive search, subjects tend to experiment less before engaging in satisficing and generally state lower aspirations. Finally, systematic satisficing seems to pay off.Keywords
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