The pathology of experience
Author:
Open Access
- 1 February 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Brain
- Vol. 127 (2) , 239-242
Abstract
The fundamental assumption of cognitive neuroscience is that the way we behave and the way we experience the world is determined by the way our brains work. Pathological cases provide the most stringent tests for this assumption. From our knowledge of the way our brains work it should be possible to predict what kind of behaviour or experience will occur as a result of damage to a specific brain region or system. Lichtheim (1885) was the first to describe this approach. In his simple model of how the brain processes speech Lichtheim pointed out that there were seven possible ‘interruption points’ in this system. He then specified the different kinds of aphasia that should result from damage at each of these points. A striking and erroneous early example of the approach concerns cerebral achromatopsia. For many years neurologists refused to accept the existence of this disorder on the basis of the mistaken belief that it was incompatible with the way the brain worked (Zeki, 1990). Today the demonstration of segregation in the visual system predicts the existence of many specific disorders including achromatopsia (impaired colour perception), akinetopsia (impaired visual movement perception) and prosopagnosia (impaired face recognition).Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Understanding Other Minds: Linking Developmental Psychology and Functional NeuroimagingAnnual Review of Psychology, 2004
- Self-awareness and actionCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology, 2003
- Capgras delusion: a window on face recognitionTrends in Cognitive Sciences, 2001
- The perception of self-produced sensory stimuli in patients with auditory hallucinations and passivity experiences: evidence for a breakdown in self-monitoringPsychological Medicine, 2000
- A subcortical pathway to the right amygdala mediating “unseen” fearProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 1999
- The 'Doppelganger': Double Visions in German LiteratureModern Language Review, 1999
- The anatomy of conscious vision: an fMRI study of visual hallucinationsNature Neuroscience, 1998
- Feedforward, horizontal, and feedback processing in the visual cortexCurrent Opinion in Neurobiology, 1998
- A CENTURY OF CEREBRAL ACHROMATOPSIABrain, 1990
- Autonomic recognition of names and faces in prosopagnosia: A neuropsychological application of the guilty knowledge testNeuropsychologia, 1984