Divided We Stand: Institutional Sources of Ethnofederal State Survival and Collapse
Author:
- 1 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 56 (2) , 165-193
Abstract
Federal states in which component regions are invested with distinct ethnic content are more likely to collapse when they contain acore ethnic region, a single ethnic region enjoying pronounced superiority in population. Dividing a dominant group into multiple federal regions reduces these dangers. A study of world casesfindsthat all ethnofederal states that have collapsed have possessed core ethnic regions. Thus, ethnofederalism, so long as it is instituted without a core ethnic region, may represent a viable way of avoiding the most deadly forms of conflict while maintaining state unity in ethnically divided countries.Keywords
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