Gossip and the efficiency of interactions
Authors:
- Dietmar FehrDFDietmar Fehr
- Matthias SutterMSMatthias Sutter
- 1 January 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 448-460
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (CRC 649)
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