Takeover protection and managerial myopia: Evidence from real earnings management
Authors:
- Yijiang ZhaoYZYijiang Zhao
- Kung H. ChenKCKung H. Chen
- Yinqi ZhangYZYinqi Zhang
- Michael DavisMDMichael Davis
- 1 January 2012
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (1) , 109-135
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 41 references indexed in Scilit:
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