Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies
Authors:
- 1 February 2007
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Difference Equations and Applications
- Vol. 13 (2-3) , 223-235
Abstract
An iterative procedure for the game of Matching Pennies is examined in which players use Nash's map to respond to mixed strategies of the other players. It is shown that even though the game of Matching Pennies has a unique Nash equilibrium point, the iterative procedure does not lead to convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In fact we find that if the game is played using this iterative procedure then the successive plays of the game will follow an orbit around the equilibrium point. This orbit has period eight and it is the only periodic orbit other than the equilibrium point.Keywords
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