POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACY
Authors:
- 13 October 2008
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 20 (3) , 335-360
Abstract
This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re‐elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy.Keywords
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