¿Se puede educar el criterio sobre el juicio moral? Una perspectiva crítica al intuicionismo social y al racionalismo kolhberiano
Open Access
- 1 April 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Universidad del Magdalena in Praxis
- Vol. 19 (1) , 136-149
Abstract
The reason-emotion dualism infers that there are two spheres for ethical evaluation: a rational one of logical thinking with which weighted moral decisions are made and, on the other hand, and in the same person, a non-rational, emotional way, which responds to automatically to stimuli and impressions. Jonathan Haidt (2001) trying to save this bivalent gap, proposed as a solution his approach to social intuitionism that amalgamates both the emotional-intuitive position for the construction of moral judgment, and anthropological, social and cultural elements that form the definitive criterion of the person to face moral dilemmas. On the other hand, Lawrence Kohlberg (1955) considers that moral judgment is constructed gradually and progressively from education rationally. In this work, both Haidt's theory and Kolhberg's theory are criticized, as it is considered to generate a reductionist and, at times, exclusionary dichotomy between the rational processes formative of morality and impressions generated by emotions. It is concluded that it is possible to educate the criterion for moral judgment because, in essence, there is no exclusionary dichotomy between intuition and reasoning, and that, on the other hand, they complement each other. El dualismo razón-emoción infiere que existen dos esferas para la valoración ética: una racional, de pensamiento lógico con el que se toman decisiones morales ponderadas, y otra, en la misma persona, no racional, emotiva, que responde de manera automática a los estímulos y a las impresiones. Una de las propuestas para salvar esta zanja bivalente es el enfoque de intuicionismo social, que amalgama tanto la posición emotiva-intuitiva para la construcción del juicio moral como elementos antropológicos, sociales y culturales que forman el criterio definitivo de la persona para enfrentar dilemas morales. Otras posturas, entretanto, plantean que el juicio moral se construye de manera gradual y progresiva desde la educación, de forma racional. En este trabajo se critican las dos teorías pues se considera que generan una dicotomía reduccionista ―y por momentos excluyente― entre los procesos racionales formativos de la moral y las impresiones generadas por las emociones. Se concluye que sí es posible educar el criterio para el juicio moral porque, en el fondo, no hay una dicotomía excluyente entre intuición y razonamiento, sino que, en cambio, se complementan.Keywords
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