Cooperation, punishment, and group change in multilevel public goods experiments
Authors:
- Kasper OttenKOKasper Otten
- Vincent BuskensVBVincent Buskens
- Wojtek PrzepiorkaWPWojtek Przepiorka
- Boaz CherkiBCBoaz Cherki
- Salomon IsraelSISalomon Israel
Open Access
- 19 January 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 164
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (024.003.025)
- Universiteit Utrecht
- Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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