Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds: Evidence from the US Congress
Author:
- 20 September 2008
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 118 (532) , 1785-1803
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Political Economics and Public Finance**We thank a number of colleagues – especially Alan Auerbach, David Baron, Tim Besley, Francesco Daveri, Avinash Dixit, and Gerard Roland – and Ph.D. students – especially Gisela Waisman – for comments on earlier drafts. Christina Lönnblad and Alessandra Startari provided editorial assistance. The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the European Commission (a TMR-Grant), and Bocconi University supported the underlying research.2002
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