Abstract
Why do firms so often fail to deliver on, or backslide from, their climate commitments? We argue that political lobbying buffers decoupling from external scrutiny, allowing firms to sustain a gap between their public commitments and their actual environmental performance. Firms invest in political influence to blunt the accountability and delay the policy and oversight pressure, preserving ambitious public commitments without fulfilling their climate targets. Using three measures of climate target attainment, including a novel text-based measure of derived from earnings-call disclosures, we find that lobbying intensity predicts lower target achievement. Employing stacked difference-indifferences across seventeen exogenous state-level policy shocks, we find that the lobbyingdecoupling relationship strengthens when firms face targeted new environmental policies that political influence can directly counter. By contrast, it weakens under Democratic administrations, when accountability pressure is more demanding, consistent with strategic rather than habitual political engagement. Institutional ownership works against this relationship, offsetting part of the decoupling that lobbying drives. These findings extend decoupling theory by identifying political lobbying as the mechanism through which firms convert institutional pressure into political protection, sustaining the gap between climate commitment and environmental performance.