Privatization, Competition, and Reform Policy Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Russian Enterprise Panel Data
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A critical, but largely unexamined assumption in the debate over transition policy design concerns the complementarity or substitutability of market competitionKeywords
All Related Versions
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