Managerial incentives for process innovation
- 7 October 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 29 (7) , 539-545
Abstract
Cost‐reducing investments by firms are often not publicly observable. This lack of observability would preclude a strategic use of process innovation. However, we show that an observable and verifiable contract that provides direct monetary incentives for cost reductions — an innovation incentive contract — can act as a strategic commitment device. Our model predicts that manager‐led firms are more innovative than owner‐led firms and that these contracts become less prevalent as product market competition intensifies. Both predictions are consistent with recent empirical evidence. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
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