EM-based detection of hardware trojans on FPGAs
Authors:
- 1 May 2014
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 84-87
Abstract
The detectability of malicious circuitry on FPGAs with varying placement properties yet has to be investigated. The authors utilize a Xilinx Virtex-II Pro target platform in order to insert a sequential denial-of-service Trojan into an existing AES design by manipulating a Xilinx-specific, intermediate file format prior to the bitstream generation. Thereby, there is no need for an attacker to acquire access to the hardware description language representation of a potential target architecture. Using a side-channel analysis setup for electromagnetic emanation (EM) measurements, they evaluate the detectability of different Trojan designs with varying location and logic distribution properties. The authors successfully distinguish the malicious from the genuine designs and provide information on how the location and distribution properties of the Trojan logic affect its detectability. To the best of their knowledge, this has been the first practically conducted Trojan detection using localized EM measurements.Keywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Red team vs. blue team hardware trojan analysis2013
- Side-channel attacks on the bitstream encryption mechanism of Altera Stratix II2013
- Bil: A tool-chain for bitstream reverse-engineering2012
- On the vulnerability of FPGA bitstream encryption against power analysis attacks2011
- Implementing hardware Trojans: Experiences from a hardware Trojan challenge2011
- Sequential hardware Trojan: Side-channel aware design and placement2011
- Hardware Trojan Horses2010
- Trustworthy Hardware: Identifying and Classifying Hardware TrojansComputer, 2010
- A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and DetectionIEEE Design & Test of Computers, 2010
- VITAMIN: Voltage inversion technique to ascertain malicious insertions in ICs2009