Imprecision and Indeterminacy in Probability Judgment
Author:
- Isaac LeviILIsaac Levi
- 1 September 1985
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 52 (3) , 390-409
Abstract
Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.Keywords
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