Role of second-order reputation evaluation in the multi-player snowdrift game on scale-free simplicial complexes
Authors:
- Shiqiang GuoSGShiqiang Guo
- Juan WangJWJuan Wang
- Dawei ZhaoDZDawei Zhao
- Chengyi XiaChengyi Xia
- 19 May 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 172
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (62172244, 62173247)
- Natural Science Foundation of Tianjin Municipality (22JCZDJC00550)
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