Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments
Authors:
- Yuanzhu LuYLYuanzhu Lu
- Julian WrightJWJulian Wright
- 1 May 2010
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 28 (3) , 298-306
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (R122000105-112)
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