Disagreement and epistemic arguments for democracy
Author:
- 4 January 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 136-155
Abstract
Recent accounts of epistemic democracy aim to show that in some qualified sense, democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes. Epistemic democrats aim to offer such accounts without presupposing any narrow, controversial view of what the outcomes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research design does not presuppose the hypothesis that the research aims to test. The article considers whether this aim is achievable. It asks, in particular, whether accounts of epistemic democracy can be reconciled with the commonly held view that disagreement about which laws and policies should be enacted is a fundamental, permanent feature of democratic politics and imposes constraints on how we justify democratic procedures.Keywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Bright Idea for Measuring Economic GrowthAmerican Economic Review, 2011
- On Seeking the Truth (Whatever That Is) through Democracy: Estlund’s Case for the Qualified Epistemic ClaimEthics, 2011
- Learning juror competence: a generalized Condorcet Jury TheoremPolitics, Philosophy & Economics, 2010
- An Epistemic Defense of Democracy: David Estlund's Democratic AuthorityEpisteme, 2008
- A Culture of Justification: The Pragmatist's Epistemic Argument for DemocracyEpisteme, 2008
- Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of KnowledgeEpisteme, 2008
- The Epistemic Value of the Democratic ProcessEpisteme, 2008
- The Epistemology of DemocracyEpisteme, 2006
- Democracy and Social ChoiceEthics, 1986
- An Epistemic Conception of DemocracyEthics, 1986