6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives
- 1 January 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Annals
- Vol. 3 (1) , 251-315
Abstract
In this chapter, we address three pay for performance (PFP) questions. First, what are the conceptual mechanisms by which PFP influences performance? Second, what programs do organizations use to implement PFP and what is the empirical evidence on their effectiveness? Third, what perils and pitfalls arise on the way from PFP theory to its execution in organizations? We address these questions in general terms, but also highlight unique issues that arise in PFP for teams and for executives. We highlight the fact that research and practice in the area of PFP requires one to deal with a number of trade‐offs. For example, strengthening PFP links can generate powerful motivation effects, but sometimes these are in unintended and unanticipated directions, resulting in undesirable effects. In addition, there are also trade‐offs in deciding the degree of emphasis to give to individual versus team performance and to results versus behaviors in PFP plans. What all this means is that, as in other areas of m...Keywords
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