Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
Authors:
- Xing LiXLXing Li
- Stephen Teng SunSSStephen Teng Sun
Preprint
- 1 January 2013
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We identify the causal effect of managerial ownership on firm performance exploiting the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut as a quasi-natural experiment, which increased thKeywords
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