Lit from Within: First-Person Thought and Illusions of Transcendence
Author:
- 3 July 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 50 (6) , 735-749
Abstract
Philosophical treatments of the self in a range of different traditions have positioned it outside the realm of ordinary worldly objects. This paper argues that part of the explanation for this seemingly widespread and persistent temptation to mystify the self is that the epistemic properties ofI-thought are apt to give rise to an illusion of transcendence about their objects—that is, about ourselves.Keywords
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