Abstract
We explore the theoretical effects of government subsidies for carbon sequestration embodied in the current U.S. policy regime, showing the extent to which they induce firms to deploy costly technology for minimal net emission reductions. We model a representative firm producing a single output with two inputs of differing carbon intensity, and the ability to sequester a portion of its emissions subject to large fixed costs and increasing marginal capture costs. Our theoretical and numerical results show that firms induced to sequester under a carbon tax would also sequester under an equal-sized sequestration subsidy, but that the subsidy can induce adoption at much lower policy values due to captured emissions generating revenue that offsets fixed costs. We document the potential for economic distortions: unlike a carbon tax, sequestration credits do not encourage substitution toward less carbon-intensive inputs, and may instead incentivize firms to maintain or even shift production toward more carbon-intensive facilities in order to maximize credit revenue. Since capture is imperfect, this can increase uncaptured emissions even as sequestration rises.