Market Power and Network Constraint in a Deregulated Electricity Market
Authors:
- In-Koo ChoICIn-Koo Cho
- 1 April 2007
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 28 (2) , 1-34
Abstract
This paper investigates the market power and the welfare performance of the deregulated wholesale electricity market of California between 1998 and 2000 by incorporating the structure of the transmission network. While Wolfram (1999), Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) treat the difference between the market price and the marginal production cost of the marginal generator as the indicator for market power, we decompose the difference into the market power and the inefficiency arising from the network constraint. Based on public data for the market from 1998 to 2000, we demonstrate that the welfare loss due to the finite transmission capacity accounts for 29-38% of the total annual welfare loss, while the remaining portion can be explained by the market power exercised by the generators.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Reliability by design in distributed power transmission networksAutomatica, 2006
- Aftershocks—And Essential Lessons—From the California Electricity DebacleThe Electricity Journal, 2003
- Competitive Equilibrium in a Radial NetworkThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2003
- Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity MarketAmerican Economic Review, 2002
- A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000†The Energy Journal, 2002
- Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power NetworksThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2000
- Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot MarketAmerican Economic Review, 1999
- Contract networks for electric power transmissionJournal of Regulatory Economics, 1992