The Year-End Trading Activities of Institutional Investors: Evidence from Daily Trades
Authors:
- Gang HuGHGang Hu
- R. David McLeanRMR. David McLean
- Jeffrey PontiffJPJeffrey Pontiff
- Qinghai WangQWQinghai Wang
- 27 September 2013
- journal article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 27 (5) , 1593-1614
Abstract
At year-end, some allege that institutional investors try to mislead investors by placing trades that inflate performance (portfolio pumping) or distort reported holdings (window dressing). We contribute direct tests using daily institutional trades and find that year-end price inflation derives from a lack of institutional selling rather than institutional buying. In fact, institutional buying declines at year-end. Consistent with pumping, institutions tend to buy stocks in which they already have large positions. We find no evidence of window dressing, as institutions are not more likely to buy high-past return stocks or sell low-past return stocks at year- or quarter-end.Keywords
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