A unified framework for equilibrium existence in strategic-form games
Author:
- 25 February 2026
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 66
Abstract
No abstract availableFunding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72371146)
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