No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science
Author:
- P. Kyle StanfordPSP. Kyle Stanford
- 1 December 2003
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 70 (5) , 913-925
Abstract
Realists have responded to challenges from the historical record of successful but ultimately rejected theories with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success-generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first, that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). I also argue that available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising.Keywords
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